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This is a first reaction (usual caveats for quick reactions apply…) to yesterday’s
decision of the German Constitutional Court on the ECB’s Public Sector Purchase
Program. This is part of the ECB broader Asset Purchase Program and it was a (the)
crucial piece of the famous “whatever it takes” approach adopted by the ECB, under
Draghi, to prevent further fragmentation of the Euro financial markets and (arguably)
save the common European currency. 
The Judgment, as the Court explicitly states, is not about the new Assets Purchases
Program (the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program) adopted by the ECB to
provide financial assistance in addressing the economic crisis generated by Covid19.
This program had not been adopted at the time the case was brought to the Court
and therefore it’s not the object of the case. But the decision is bound to have an
impact on such Program too. It is likely to question its credibility. The judgment will
also shape Germany’s position in the context of the current discussions on the EU
economic response to the crisis. In fact, I would argue that the decision is way more
relevant for the future role of the ECB, in the context of the financial assistance
decisions to be taken by the European Union to address the Covid 19 crisis, than
with respect to the actual decisions that are the object of the Court’s judgment.
The decision is equally of great importance with respect to the principle of
supremacy of EU law and the relationship between national constitutional and
supreme courts and the European Court of Justice.  It may open the doors for open
revolt by other Courts and also national governments. This will be particularly the
case in Eurosceptic countries that are currently involved in legal and political battles
on the rule of law with the European Union.
1.
The focus of the initial media coverage has been on the fact that the German
Constitutional Court considered the program to violate the principle of proportionality
while giving the ECB three months to present a stronger justification for why the
program, and decisions implementing it, are proportional. In my view, this will be the
less relevant and easier to dispose of all legal aspects of the judgment:
• The ECB is not under the jurisdiction of the German Constitutional Court (and
even declined to appear in the case, probably fearing legitimating the idea of
such jurisdiction and to open a precedent for all similar requests by courts of
all Member States). The Court therefore targets its judgment at German public
organs (notably government, parliament, central bank – the Bundesbank –
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and courts) requiring them to take all possible measures to reverse the policy
of the ECB and not to take any implementing acts. The Court states that the
“ultra vires act is not to be applied in Germany” and has no binding effect on
those organs. In the case of the central bank this will mean for example that it
ought not to buy German bonds under such program. This is limited in its legal
reach, as it does not set aside the program and the decisions implementing
it. However, it will partially hinder the credibility of the program and puts
those German bodies in the difficult position of having to choose between its
constitutional and EU commitments. And, with Germany being required by its
Constitutional Court to actively work to undermine the program, the credibility
of the later will suffer a serious blow. There is, however, a possible solution for
everybody to safe face. In fact, the Court does not exclude that the measure
can be proportional. It simply considers that the ECB failed to put forward any
arguments demonstrating that (and that the ECJ failed to require that from
it in its own review of the decision in Gauweiler). To some extent, more than
proportionality it seems that the ECB starts, in the view of the German Court,
by failing on its duty to give reasons. I don’t think the ECB can and will directly
comply with the German Court’s judgment. To do so would open the door to
multiple national legal challenges, placing it under the jurisdiction of all national
high courts, with disastrous consequences for the ECB and its role under the
Treaties. But, without directly addressing the German Constitutional Court
demand, the ECB may adopt a new decision with a more in depth justification of
the program. This justification will likely mostly pay lip service to the arguments
on proportionality raised by the Constitutional Court. But that may be sufficient
to provide the justification needed by German authorities, that are the actual
addressees of the judgment, to say that the requirement the Court has imposed
has been fulfilled by the ECB and the problem is therefore solve. Naturally,
those that brought this case will argue otherwise but that will have to be done
through a new case: time will be gained (and the composition of the Court will
also partly change). 
• This will also allow the Commission to avoid the hot potato of what to do
regarding the challenge brought by the German Constitutional Court not only
to the ECB but also to the ECJ and EU law supremacy. If, within these three
months, German authorities will assess the new decisions of the ECB and
determine that they provide a satisfactory support for their proportionality,
they can continue to implement the ECB policy and, particularly, so can
the Bundesbank. If so, there is no EU law infringement. In themselves, the
statements of the German Constitutional Court with regard to the ECJ role are
not an infringement if the judgment will no longer produce any effects contrary to
EU law and its supremacy. The Commission could, in this way, continue to claim
the supremacy of EU law without having to actually pursue an infringement
against Germany.
• I foresee therefore that this decision will not be hard to address as to its actual
legal outcome, contrary to what might seem at first instance. But its market
effects may be highly problematic. The uncertainty the decision will generate
in the short term and the constraints arising from the obiter dicta of the Court
for Germany’s participation in the EU response to the Coronavirus situation will
likely have some serious negative effects. In addition, such obiter dicta are also
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likely, as I will try to explain below, to open up a dangerous path to be explored
by illiberal regimes in the EU.
2.
On the substance of the proportionality assessment by the German Court I will be
brief. The Court is very critical of what it calls the methodological flaws of the ECJ
reasoning in the European’s court decision (Gauweiler) that “validated” the ECB
program. But the German Court bases its own approach on a substantially flawed
reasoning too. 
The German Court starting point is that the ECB can only adopt such a program
in order to pursue monetary policy objectives. In this case, the objective – that is
recognized as legitimate in the decision- is the inflation target (the argument, put
forward by Draghi, in its presentation of this program, that this was also necessary
to secure the stability of the Euro currency is ignored). For the German Court, as
well as for the ECJ, the ECB cannot adopt the program in order to pursue economic
and fiscal objectives. Both courts converge, moreover, in the assessment that, while
there are monetary objectives pursued by the program, and that are these are what
legitimates it, the program also has economic effects. 
Having said this, the German Court goes on to require the ECB to balance the
monetary policy objective with what it presents as a variety of economic, fiscal and
political costs resulting from the program. From undermining the independence
of the ECB and the budgetary discipline of the Member States to imposing losses
on private savings or creating real estate and stock market bubbles. There is a
paradox in this. Basically the Court argues that the ECB can only guide its action,
and the decision to intervene, by the monetary policy objectives but then requires
it to incorporate into its analysis the possible economic, fiscal and political costs.
But, if that is so, shouldn’t the economic, fiscal and political benefits of the monetary
oriented decisions also be taken into account in such balance? No appropriate
proportionality analysis can be done by limiting the scope of the benefits to be taken
into account but not the scope of the costs… Instead, the German Court’s decision
seems to say that the ECB cannot take into account the economic and fiscal benefits
that may arise from its monetary oriented decisions but must take into account all the
potential economic, political and fiscal costs. This is profoundly inconsistent.
3.
The most problematic aspect of the decision for the European Union at the moment
is, however, and ironically, in the point of law where the judgment actually upholds
the Public Sector Purchase Program of the ECB and the decision of the ECJ. 
This regards the compatibility of the Program with Article 123 (prohibition of
monetary financing). The German Constitutional Court agrees with the Court of
Justice that this program does not necessarily circumvent Article 123. However,
it reads the European Court’s judgment as imposing as necessary conditions for
such compatibility a set of requirements that are in the initial purchasing program but
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are no longer in the one recently adopted to provide emergency assistance in the
context of the pandemic.
The European Court of Justice does indeed mentions in Gauweiler several
conditions that are part of the original program as justifying such program. They
serve to demonstrate that the program does not violate Article 123 and it’s crafted
in such a way as to still impose budgetary sounds policies on Member States by
preserving market discipline. But the European Court is not explicit in saying that
they are necessary conditions, absent of which the program will violate the Treaty.
There might be other alternative conditions that would equally preserve the Treaty
objectives of sound fiscal and budgetary policies of the Member States. The German
Constitutional Court, however, reads the judgment of the Court of Justice so as
to make those conditions, not simply sufficient to prove compatibility with Article
123, but necessary for such compatibility. In fact, it appears to make this reading
its own condition to endorse this part of the judgment of the ECJ. The conditions
are explicitly restated in an almost list form by the German Constitutional Court
and include: volume of purchases limited in advance; purchase limit set at 33%;
purchases carried out according to the capital key of the ECB etc. 
The problem this raises is that these conditions are no longer met by the new
Pandemic Purchasing Program of the ECB. While the German Court states that this
judgment does not apply to the new program (because, as stated, it did not existed
at the time and was not the object of the challenge brought before the Court), the
final part of the judgment seems to be drafted so as to make clear that the German
Court believes that this new program violates Article 123 and is even contrary to the
judgment of the European Court Justice interpreting such provision. This is bound to
bring new challenges and raise a high degree of legal uncertainty with respect to the
new ECB program, with likely consequences in the markets and for the interest rates
of the sovereign debt of Member States.
4.
Overall the judgment stresses the extent to which the German Constitutional Court
interpretation of the German Basic Law limits forms of debt mutualisation in the EU
(either direct or indirect, through the ECB). This will further constrain the ongoing
discussions on the model that the EU economic response to the Covid19 crisis
should take. 
At the core of it is the link made, already in past decisions, by the German
Constitutional Court, between democracy and fiscal autonomy and responsibility.
The German Court sees forms of debt mutualisation as an encroachment on
German democracy. This is so because they make the German people responsible
for decisions taken by others and can limit their freedom of democratic deliberation
by reason of liabilities incurred by others. This leads the German Court to impose
strict limits both on what Germany can be liable for and regarding the forms through
which even such limited liability may take place (requiring parliament involvement
and strict conditionality). It’s easy to see how this constraints Germany’s involvement
in risking sharing in the Union. Moreover, since these are constitutional limits, they
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restrict the possibility for these issues to be addressed by Treaty amendments (eg
on the role of the ECB). 
There is, however, a silver lining. This may be the final wake up call for the
importance to deal with risk sharing through genuine EU own resources (as I’ve
been arguing for long). The only way to avoid the debt mutualisation constitutional
and political trap is to move to a genuinely European approach to risk sharing. One
where such risk is shared on the basis of limited liabilities that are guaranteed by
resources that do not depend on the States but are genuinely European. In this
case the liabilities of the different European’s peoples will not go beyond what
they may be required to pay for those own resources as citizens of the Union.
Their democracies will not be liable for the other European peoples decisions.
This judgment demonstrates again the soundness of the call for new genuine own
resources as the basis on which to support whatever EU action may be necessary
and to define in that way how – and to what extent – risk is shared in the EU. This
may provide a solution to the ongoing discussions in the EU, one that will also be
compatible with the German’s Constitutional Court requirements.
5.
Finally, in spite of what I say in 1, we should not ignore the risks of the challenge to
the ECJ and EU law that this judgment includes. After having for long threatened
to put a break on what some conceive as a too deferential ECJ approach to EU
competences, the German Constitutional Court seems to finally have acted on it. On
should not exclude, given the human nature of courts, that the German Court might
have succumbed to the appeal to show that it could “bite” instead of simply “barking”.
This might have been reinforced by the, partially, unfortunate style of the ECJ ruling
that did not show much willingness to engage, at a deeper level, with the arguments
raised by the Constitutional Court in its reference to the ECJ. This said, it is the
wrong decision at the wrong moment. It is bound to legitimate similar actions by
other supreme and constitutional courts. It will also legitimate challenges by national
governments (the Polish government reaction to the decision demonstrates that).
This will be particularly problematic in the case of countries where the rule of law is
under severe challenge. For the German Constitutional Court to ignore this current
context is particularly troublesome. 
It is true that the heart of the approach of the German Court is not new. It is also
true that this parochial approach to the relationship with EU law is not unique to this
Court. I’ve defended a form of constitutional pluralism that leaves margin for dissent
and promotes dialogue with the ECJ. But I’ve always argued that this dialogue must
take place in the context of an agreement on a common set of principles to guide
it. One crucial aspect is the need for constitutional courts not to loose sight, when
they engage with EU law, that they are part of a system with other legal orders,
with different needs, and must try to accommodate these needs and interpret
their national constitutions in that light. That is not the case with an approach that,
under the cover of protecting national democracy, makes a limited reading of
what democracy means today, in a context of increased interdependence. This
parochial approach is, unfortunately, taking hold in other constitutional courts. For
example, Portugal’s Constitutional Court has adopted a similar approach during the
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adjustment program years. The same hermeneutic model to interpret the relation
with EU law but reaching totally opposite conclusions to those of the German
Constitutional court as to the character of the adjustment programs and conditions
for financial assistance. The reason for this paradox highlights the problem with the
parochial approach: to see the relationship with EU law as if it was not part of an
engagement of our legal order with other national legal orders, that have different
constitutional needs that are equally deserving of accommodation.
The current rule of law problems in several Member States make the timing of this
decision particularly problematic.  And it is sad that one of Europe’s most respected
highest courts did not take that into account. Ironically, it’s also likely to lead, not
only to increased tensions between national constitutional courts and the ECJ, but
between those national constitutional courts themselves (as they will feel equally
tempted to become active participants in the “negotiation” of the European grand
bargaining on how to answer the current crisis).
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